Earnings are the flow of value created by corporations. I concentrate on the concept called EBITDA-earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. This measure captures the results of the substantive non-financial activities of corporations and corresponds to the rental price of capital multiplied by the quantity of capital. I measure earnings per dollar of capital for all U.S. corporations and in 5 selected industries. I develop a competitive benchmark for the level of earnings, which takes account of adjustment costs, taxes, depreciation, and the financial opportunity cost of funds. I find that aggregate corporate earnings track the benchmark reasonably closely, leaving a relatively small unexplained component. Thus evidence of the flow of value gives little help in explaining the large discrepancies found in earlier work in the level of the market value of claims on corporations relative to the replacement cost of the capital stock. At the industry level, I find more volatility of both actual and benchmark earnings, with a high correlation between the two in 3 of the 5 industries.
I. Introduction
Earnings are the flow of value accruing to a claimant. In standard corporate accounting, the claimant is the body of shareholders. The value of the claims of the shareholders-reflected in the corporation's value in the stock market-is the present value of future shareholder earnings. Those earnings are the net flow after satisfying the claims of debt holders. In addition, as recent experience has shown, shareholder earnings are buffeted by changes in the value of the financial claims of the corporation on other businesses. Where the market values of those claims are in doubt, there is corresponding doubt about shareholder earnings.
A great deal of business analysis of earnings cuts around most of these problems by adopting, implicitly, a different accounting framework. That framework considers all of the financial claims on a business rather than focusing just on the shareholders' residual claim.
In particular, the measure called EBITDA-earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization-is a popular measure of business performance. It isolates the substantive results of business activities from changes in the firm's financial portfolio. The isolation cannot be completely successful. In particular, it is almost impossible in banks and other financial institutions whose business activities involve operating portfolios. In addition, borderline activities such as the sale of services or software to business partners often cannot be cleanly divided between operating and financial activities. Nonetheless, EBITDA is a useful measure. This paper is about the economics of EBITDA.
The first step is to measure earnings at the level of all U.S. corporations. The National Income and Product Accounts are the natural starting point for this exercise. The NIPA concept of profit is the residual from the sale of goods and services less costs of current inputs-it excludes the portfolio flows that complicate shareholder earnings. To bring profit up to EBITDA, I add corporate interest payments, taxes, and depreciation (NIPA profit makes no deductions for amortization). I state earnings as a ratio to the estimated reproduction cost of corporations' tangible capital-plant, equipment, and inventories. Thus the earnings concept is earnings per dollar of tangible capital.
The second step is to develop a competitive benchmark for earnings. In a competitive economy, tangible capital services are supplied perfectly elastically to a corporation at a flow price that depends on taxation, depreciation, and risk. That is, the corporation must cover the costs of taxes and depreciation and repay the suppliers of finance for bearing risk. With perfect competition, earnings will equal the supply price of capital services. My benchmark considers risk as it is measured in modern financial economics as a determinant of the average value of earnings. The benchmark also incorporates adjustment costs. In the presence of adjustment costs, earnings include scarcity rents when the capital stock is growing. The benchmark uses an estimate of the coefficient relating Tobin's q to the growth of the capital stock to take these rents into account.
The third step is to compare measured earnings with the benchmark. I find that the benchmark accounts for most of the movements of the actual ratio of earnings to the replacement cost of the capital stock. This finding contrasts with my earlier work, which found a large gap between the market value of corporations and the value of their measured capital. The two findings are not strictly contradictory, however, because measured earnings are affected in two ways by intangible capital, and the two effects could be largely offsetting. On the one hand, earnings include the flow of value that corporations enjoy from their stocks of intangibles. On the other hand, earnings deduct the current cost of forming new intangibles.
II. Measuring Earnings
The Data Appendix describes the calculations and sources more fully. The complete details of all the calculations in the paper are in a set of spreadsheets available from Stanford.edu/~rehall. The flow benchmark developed here is a close relative of the value benchmark considered in my earlier paper (Hall [2001] ). The benchmark in the earlier paper for the total value of all financial claims on a corporation is the value of the capital stock held by the corporation. A direct arbitrage argument shows that the value of financial claims should equal the benchmark, as a corporation can issue claims and buy capital profitably if the claims are worth more than the capital, or an outsider can buy claims to obtain the underlying capital if the claims are worth less than the capital. The paper extended this principle to take account of adjustment costs. Consequently, my earlier paper did not examine the present value of earnings as a benchmark for corporate value.
The flow benchmark turns out to be more complicated than the value benchmark because production takes time. The firm chooses factor inputs in one period and sells the resulting output in the next period. The decision takes into consideration the financial risk of the funds tied up in capital and inventories while production occurs. Where the value benchmark is a single number-the current replacement value of the capital stock-the flow benchmark is a random variable. The fundamental condition defining the flow benchmark is stochastic.
A. Derivation of the flow benchmark
Under constant returns to scale, the value of a corporation per unit of capital is independent of its scale. Thus, without loss of generality, one can examine the value of a corporation that starts with one unit of capital in year t and allows it to depreciate without replacement. At a depreciation rate δ , the firm will hold 1 δ − units a year later, ( ) 
Consequently, any random variable, ,K t r , satisfying
could serve as a benchmark. The second factor inside the expectation is the return ratio, 
I define the risk premium as
and the return ratio, f R , for a hypothetical risk-free one-period real bill as
This equation states the implications of equation (3.4) in the form of a Capital Asset Pricing Model. Expected return is a positive function of risk. Equation (3.9) suggests two approaches to measuring the return to capital. One is to take the realized actual return over an appropriate period. The other is to measure the risk premium from the covariance of the realized return with an empirical stochastic discounter and apply the premium to the risk-free rate, according to the right-hand side of the equation. Economists who study securities markets have a strong preference for the second procedure, because the variance of realized returns for equities is high. Consequently, measures of average returns are unreliable but measures of covariances are adequately reliable. As I will explain shortly, the variance of the returns to capital is nowhere near as high as the variance of the returns to equity, so I use the realized average, K R . I will refer to this quantity as the financial cost of capital.
With these ingredients, I can provide a characterization of the benchmark more operational than the general definition in equation (3.4). A benchmark return ratio is related to the benchmark earnings by
Here π is the unconditional expectation of the rate of growth of the price of capital goods, 
B.
Returns with adjustment costs, taxation, and inventories I take account of adjustment costs by reinterpreting the price of capital goods, K p .
That price is the market price for newly produced capital goods in the absence of adjustment costs and is the internal shadow value of installed capital in the presence of adjustment costs. In the latter case, K p is the purchase price, K p , multiplied by Tobin's q (this is just the definition of q). I measure Tobin's q from the first-order condition for quadratic adjustment costs,
The evidence across the industries considered in Hall [2003] suggests that a typical value for γ is about one, the value I adopt here. The results would be similar across a range of values consistent with that evidence and with other work on estimating adjustment costs from the Euler equation.
To take account of inventories, I let 
The literature on measuring the return to capital-notably Poterba [1998] -has not always included the last two terms, representing capital gains on capital goods. The rate of return without those terms is the own rate on capital, rather than the real rate based on treating consumption goods as numeraire. As a practical matter, the difference is small, because the prices of capital and consumption goods generally move together.
C. Measuring the return to investment
The formulation in equation (3.14) clarifies the role of risk in the determination of earnings. Risk arises from uncertainty about earnings per unit of capital and about the price of capital goods next period. In the simplest case, where consumption goods are perfect substitutes for output and capital goods, there is no uncertainty about capital goods prices and the risk premium arises only from uncertainty about output per unit of capital. On the other hand, the price of fixed capital goods fluctuates in the presence of adjustment costs.
The risk premium is likely to be positive in this case-favorable events raise the shadow value and lower marginal utility, so the covariance of the return with the pricing kernel is negative and the risk premium, φ , correspondingly positive. Similarly, if the adjustment costs are external, arising in the industries supplying capital goods, , K t p is the observed price, which is likely to be negatively correlated with marginal utility, and again the risk premium is positive.
The standard approach in modern finance is to measure the risk of a security's return from equation (3.7) and then to apply equation (3.9) to infer its expected return-see Cochrane [2001] . The reasons are twofold: First, persuasive evidence shows that expected returns vary over time (Campbell and Shiller [1998] ). Second, realized returns have high dispersion with thick tails, so that estimates of expected returns from the sample mean of historical returns have large sampling errors while estimates of covariances are adequately precise.
I think the balance tips in the opposite direction for the return to corporate tangible capital. The dispersion of returns to capital is far less than for returns to the S&P 500. The standard deviation of the return to capital is 0.028 as against 0.150 for the S&P (return calculated from data from Robert Shiller's website). The standard error of the estimated mean for the return to capital is 38 basis points as against 207 basis points for the S&P. To put the difference most dramatically, it would take 1559 years of data for the S&P to measure its unconditional expected return with the same precision obtained here from 54 years of data for the return to capital.
The precision of estimation of the mean of the realized return to capital is sufficient to explore for variations over time. There is statistically unambiguous evidence of a slightly lower return in the second half of the sample period, from the mid-1970s onward.
This was a period of rising real returns to debt, so a financial model such as the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model that portrays risky returns as the sum of a time-varying return to risk-free debt plus a constant risk premium would contradict the evidence from the mean of the realized return.
The compelling reason to avoid an inference of the expected return from a risk premium and a risk-free return, as in equation (3.9), is that finance has yet to resolve fundamental puzzles about measuring the stochastic discounter in equation (3.7) in a way that rationalizes the pricing of securities. The stochastic discounter needs to have extreme volatility to rationalize the equity premium (Hansen and Jagannathan [1991] ) but the marginal rate of substitution from any but the most exotic preferences falls far short of that volatility (Campbell and Cochrane [1999] ). Without much guidance about how to construct the stochastic discounter in practice, I am thrown back on the simple calculation of the mean of the realized return.
D. Components of the benchmark
The earnings shown in Figure 1 
(3.17)
Thus the benchmark for earnings per dollar of capital measured at acquisition price is:
(3.18)
With zero weight for inventories ( 1 t ω = ), this equation is close to the discrete-time version of Hall and Jorgenson's [1967] rental price of capital, but is not exactly the same because it is the expected value of the realized income, not the rent that would be set in advance in a competitive market for rental contracts. The latter would command a risk premium not included here-specifically, the conditional expectation of the ratio of the future to the current capital goods price would be replaced by the conditional expectation of the product of the pricing kernel and the price ratio.
The final step is to provide empirical counterparts to the conditional expectations of the growth ratios of the real prices of capital goods, 
The final step in the derivation of the benchmark is to relate the annual equivalents of tax benefits, where t f is the rate of growth of the nominal inventory price.
The rate of return from equation (3.14) averages 4.46 percent with a standard error of 0.38 percentage points. This corresponds reasonably closely to Poterba's [1998] estimate of 5.1 percent. Poterba does not decompose total corporate taxes as in equation (3.14), but rather simply treats all taxes paid as a deduction from the return. 1 9 4 7 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 Earnings Benchmark 1 9 4 7 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 1 Depreciation Tax rate Tobin's q Tax incentives Inventory mix 
IV. Comparison of Actual to Benchmark Earnings

V. Industry Earnings
The NIPAs do not provide detail to carry out calculations for corporations at the industry level. I am limited to calculations for all forms of business. The NIPA accounting system does not separate the earnings of capital from the earnings of labor for noncorporate entities, which are mainly proprietorships and partnerships. Logical methods for imputing earnings result in puzzlingly low returns to capital for non-corporate businesssee Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen [2002] . To avoid this problem, I limit the calculations to industries with small non-corporate sectors. The only measure that the NIPAs report for corporate and non-corporate businesses separately is capital consumption allowances. Further, the NIPAs do not provide consistent detail for fine industry breakdowns. Two key variables, inventories and net interest, are available only at roughly the 1-digit SIC level. In these industries, I inflated corporate profits slightly to account for the fact that all other variables are measured at the total business level-I divided corporate profits by the counterpart of the percentage shown in Table 1 , for each year. In all other respects, the calculations at the industry level are the same as those for total corporate business discussed earlier. 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9
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Figure 4. Actual and Benchmark Earnings per Dollar of Capital for Five Selected Industries
To investigate the nature of the departures of actual from benchmark earnings, I
estimated the following descriptive regression:
Here L is the lag operator, ρ is the serial correlation of the disturbance, and t ε is the innovation in the disturbance. Table 3 shows the results. across industries. These differences are reflected in the underlying rates of return, to the extent that differences in depreciation rates and other determinants do not account for them. Table 3 shows that the differences in rates of return are substantial. Some of the differences may result from variations in financial risk-manufacturing and wholesale trade may be riskier than communication and utilities, in the sense of having returns more negatively correlated with the stochastic discounter of equation (3.7). 
VI. Contribution of Earnings Discrepancies to Valuation Discrepancies
The value of a corporation includes the present value of the earnings it enjoys in excess of the benchmark. Let t d be the discrepancy in year t between actual and benchmark earnings. If the risk of the discrepancy is the same as the risk of earnings in general, then the earnings discrepancy contributes
to the value of the corporation. If the discrepancy follows a univariate AR(1) process with parameter ρ , the corresponding value component is
The AR coefficient ρ has the value 0.62 for total corporate earnings. Higher-order AR processes contributed nothing meaningful to the fit. I have not found detailed data on financial claims for any sector that matches a sector for which I can carry out the NIPA-based earnings calculations. Figure 5 shows that the present value of the earnings discrepancy is tiny in comparison to the valuation discrepancy. Further, the two are only slightly positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.22. I conclude that the small earnings discrepancies uncovered in this paper do not help in understanding the volatility of the stock market. 6 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 Valuation discrepancy PDV of Earnings Discrepancy , gross investment in intangibles.
The condition for exact cancellation is
That is, smooth growth of the flow of investment and thus of the stock of intangibles at a rate equal to the cost of capital will result in zero discrepancy between actual reported earnings and the benchmark based on tangible capital alone. Intangibles will be invisible in earnings.
The valuation discrepancy in Figure 5 does not follow a path of constant growth.
Some other factor is at work. Consider the following possibility: Each period, the stock of intangibles rises or falls by a random amount t g , unrelated to the formation of new intangibles. Assume that the present value of t g as of period t-1 is zero. From equation 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 These increments come very close to satisfying the condition of unpredictabilitynot surprisingly, because they are close to being capital gains on securities, which are known to be essentially unpredictable. But the increments are large, sometimes exceeding 100 percent at annual rates. The view that intangibles account for broad swings in corporate value, despite being invisible in corporate earnings, is at best at the borderline of credibility.
VII. Concluding Remarks
This paper on the flow of value created by corporations has close connections, both in approach and in conclusions, with my earlier paper (Hall [2001] 
Data Appendix
Total corporate earnings for Figure 1 . Corporate profits before tax and corporate interest from NIPA Table 1 .15. Corporate capital consumption allowances from NIPA Table 6 .22. Corporate earnings are the sum of the three components.
Corporate capital for Figure 1 . Corporate fixed capital from NIPA Fixed Asset Price index for inventories, Figure 2 . From NIPA Table 7 .16, implicit price deflators for private inventories.
Price index for consumption, Figure 2 . From NIPA Table 7 .1, implicit price deflator for consumption. where r is the 6-month Treasury bill rate. Total and corporate capital consumption allowances, Table 1 . Corporate from NIPA Table 6 .22, non-corporate from NIPA Table 6 .13.
Value of plant and equipment, Figure 4 . From FAT 3.1ES. Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 5 .12.
Value of inventories,
Corporate profits before tax, Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 6 .17
Net interest, Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 6 .15.
Corporate capital consumption allowances, Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 6 .22.
Non-corporate capital consumption allowances, Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 6 .13.
Depreciation, Figure 4 . From FAT 3.4ES.
Plant and equipment price, Figure 4 . Nominal capital from FAT 3.7 divided by real capital, FAT 3.8.
Inventories price, Figure 4 . From NIPA Table 7 .16.
